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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The authority believed to confer jurisdiction on the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah to hear this Petition for Review
of the final decision of the Utah State Tax Commission

(the

"Commission") is Uta^t Code Annotated §§63-46-14 and 78-2-2 (e) (ii) .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review in this
case1:
1.

Whether,

absent

the

intent

to

establish

a

new

domicile, temporary residence away from an established domicile for
a mere temporary or special purpose, even for a period of years,
results in the abandonment of the original domicile,
2.

If so, whether the party alleging the abandonment of

the original domicile has the burden of proof to establish at what
point the original domicile is abandoned and the new domicile is
established.
3.

Whether the Commission erred in not addressing the

residency status of Appellants James O'Rourke and Beverly O'Rourke
(the "O'Rourkes") on a year-by-year, or period-by-period, basis.
4.

In light of the unrebutted evidence produced at the

formal hearing before the Commission held on January 14, 1991 (the

1

In order to simplify the organization of the Argument section
in light of the number of issues presented for review, not all of
the issues will be addressed in separate argument sections.
1

"Hearing") establishing that Mr, O'Rourke was not present within
Utah more than 125 days during any year in question, whether the
Commission offered sufficient evidence to carry its burden to show
that Mr. O'Rourke abandoned his established domicile in Florida and
established a new domicile in Utah and, if so, at what point Mr.
O'Rourke abandoned his domicile in Florida.
5.

Whether"a wife's and/or children's physical presence

in a particular place determines a husband's domicile if the
husband has no intention of making that place his permanent or
indefinite home.
6.

Whether the sale of a place of abode in an established

domicile and the acquisition of a place of abode in another place,
without the intention of remaining in the location of the new place
of abode either permanently

or indefinitely,

results

in the

abandonment of the established domicile.
7.

Whether the Commission's decision assessing taxes

against the O'Rourkes as to all the audit periods in question is
supported by substantial evidence based on the whole record.
8.

Whether the Commission is precluded, as a result of

the actions of its representatives, from claiming the O'Rourkes
were residents of Utah for income tax purposes for some or all of
the periods in question because of the doctrines of waiver and/or
estoppel.
9.

If the Commission is not precluded from claiming the

O'Rourkes were residents of Utah for all of the periods in
2

question, whether the Commission has the burden of proof to show
that there was a fundamental change in the O'Rourkes' circumstances
during the periods in which the Commission is not precluded from
claiming the O'Rourkes were Utah residents.
10. Whether the Commission's failure to address the waiver
and/or estoppel issue in its final decision constitutes error.
The applicable standards of review for the issues stated
above are as follows:
(a) For a review of the Commission's interpretations of
general questions of law, the applicable standard of review is the
"correction of error" standard.

Under this standard, this Court

should review the Commission's rulings for correctness, but accord
no deference to the expertise of the Commission.

Utah Dept. of

Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n.. 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983);
(b) The applicable standard of review for issues of fact
is the "substantial evidence11 or "whole record" test, under which
this Court must consider not only the evidence supporting the
Commission's factual findings, but also the evidence that fairly
detracts from the weight of the Commission's evidence.

Grace

Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989);
and
(c) The applicable standard of review for questions of
mixed law and fact is the "reasonableness or rationality" test,
under which the Commission's decisions must fall within the limits
of reasonableness or rationality.
3

Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v.

Pub. Serv. Com'n., 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983).

See also. Hurley v.

Board of Review of Indus. Com;n., 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR RULES
There

are

no

constitutional

provisions,

statutes,

ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is believe to
be solely determinative of the outcome of this case.

Many

provisions of the Utah Code and the Rules and Regulations of the
Commission are, however, relevant to the disposition of this
Petition for Review.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature

of

the

Case,

Course

of

Proceedings

and

Disposition by the Commission. This is a petition for review of a
final

decision made

by

the

Commission

with

respect

to the

O'Rourkes' residency status for Utah state income tax purposes
during the audit periods 1983 through 1988.

In January and

February of 1990, the Commission determined that the O'Rourkes were
required, but had failed, to file Utah income tax returns for the
years 1983 through 1988, and sent Notices of Estimated Income Tax
Returns, assessing unpaid Utah income taxes, penalties and interest
to the O'Rourkes totalling $24,300.89, as follows:

$2,450.16 in

taxes, penalties and interest for 1983; $1,937.03 in taxes and
interest for 1984; $5,622.42 in taxes, penalties and interest for
1985;

$4,727.78

in taxes, penalties
4

and

interest

for 1986;

$5,307.03 in taxes, penalties and interest for 1987; and $4,256.47
in taxes, penalties and inteirest for 1988.
The O'Rourkes filed a timely Petition for Redetermination
and Notice in letter form, which the Commission answered on or
about February 5, 1990.

On March 6, 1990, the O'Rourkes filed a

Reply to the Commission's Answer To Petition for Redetermination
and Notice, and a formal hearing (the "Hearing") was held on the
matter on January 14, 1991, before Paul Iwasaki, a Hearing Officer
for the Commission. At the Hearing, the sole issue was whether the
O'Rourkes were residents of Utah for income tax purposes under Utah
Code Annotated §59-10-103(1)(j)(i).
On April 2, 1991, the Commission issued its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision (the "Final Decision"),
finding that, for all periods in question, the O'Rourkes were
residents of Utah for income tax purposes.

On May 2, 1991, the

O'Rourkes filed a Notice of Petition For Review with this court
requesting a review of the Final Decision.
2.

Statement of Facts. The basic facts of this case are

largely undisputed.

During the periods in question, Mr. O'Rourke

was a commercial airline pilot who flew extensively throughout the
United States and who was only infrequently in Utah. Mrs. O'Rourke
was a housewife.

In the early 1980's, after residing for several

years in the Miami, Florida area, the O'Rourkes decided to move to
central Florida and purchased some property in that area on which
to build a home. Due to a number of unforeseen financial problems,
5

they were not able to begin construction of their home on their
property.

Since they felt it was important for their children to

move from the Miami area, they decided to temporarily settle in
Salt Lake City,

The unrebutted testimony of Mr. O'Rourke is that

the O'Rourkes always intended to return to Florida once their
Florida home was completed; however, they were repeatedly forced to
delay their return because of unforeseen financial setbacks.
(a)

The Years Before the O'Rourkes Came to Utah.

Prior to their move to Utah, the O'Rourkes lived in Florida,
primarily in the Miami area, and always considered it to be their
home (Transcript of the Hearing ("Tr.") at 9-11; Exhibit ("Ex.") P17 at Response Nos. 7 and 26) . In 1966, Mr. O'Rourke was employed
by Eastern Airlines, and in 1980 was promoted to the position of
captain.

(Tr. at 12) To qualify for the promotion, however, he

was required to change his base of operations2 from Miami to New
York City.

(Tr. at 12, 76) . Since pilots are generally allowed to

fly as regular passengers anywhere on their airline flight system
for little or no charge, Mr. O'Rourke could "commute" to his new
base of operations in New York from his home in Florida, and did
not have to move his family from their home in Miami.

z

(Tr. at 13) .

A pilot's base of operations determines the beginning and
ending place of each flight sequence he flies. Each sequence may
involve flights to several cities, but each sequence is designed so
that the pilot begins and ends the sequence in the same city, the
pilot's base of operations.
(Tr. at 93-95).
Airline pilots
frequently maintain bases of operation which are different from the
places their families reside. (Tr. at 13).
6

In 1980, as a result of dramatic increases in crime, drugs
and gang warfare in Miami, the O'Rourkes decided to move to central
Florida.

(Tr. at 14-15; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 3). Since they

intended to move to a location which was close enough to an airport
on the Eastern Airlines system that Mr. O'Rourke could commute to
his base of operations in New York City, the move would not
adversely affect his employment.

(Tr. at 13; Ex. P-17 at Response

No. 3) .
(1)

The Purchatse of the Eustis Property.

In mid-

January, 1981, after an extensive property search, the O'Rourkes
acquired 32 acres of property near the city of Eustis, Florida.
Approximately 28 acres of the property contained mature orange
groves.

(Tr. at 15; P-17 at Response No. 3) .

intended

to

make

substantial

improvements

to

The O'Rourkes
the

property,

including a home, a roadway, a combination barn/garage/storage
shed, and an irrigation system for the orange trees.

(Tr. at 18) .

They completed initial sketches, layout plans and architectural
drawings for these improvements in late 1981 (Ex. P-17 at Response
Nos. 11 and 12) . The O'Rourkes planned to pay for the construction
of the improvements with the proceeds of the orange grove's
production, which they believed would net them approximately $1,000
per acre of orange grove per year.

(Tr. at 19; Ex. P-17 at

Response No. 3) .
In early 1981, Mr. O'Rourke's parents, who also lived in
Miami, also began making plans to move to central Florida.
7

(Tr. at

19) . To assist them in their move, the O'Rourkes acquired another
7.5 acres of property (including 4 acres of mature orange grove)
adjacent to the 32 acres they already owned in Eustis.

The

O'Rourkes promised to build a home for their parents on this
property.

(Tr. at 19-20, 64; Ex. P-17 at Response Nos. 3 and 9).
(2) The Destruction of the 1981 Orange Crop and the

Marginal 1982 Orange Crop. One week after the O'Rourkes bought the
Eustis property, a "ten-year freeze" occurred, destroying their
orange crop completely and causing damage to several acres of their
trees.

(Tr. at 20, 65) .

As a result, the O'Rourkes lost all

revenue from the 1981 orange crop, which was to be used to begin
construction of their home.

(Tr. at 21).

In addition, they were

required to spend another approximately $30,000 in 1981 for extra
pruning, fertilizing and agricultural care for the groves.

(Tr. at

20-21; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 3). At the same time, they were
required to make principal payments on the Eustis property in the
approximate amount of $12,000, and continued to maintain their home
in Miami (Ex. P-17 at Response No. 3).
During the 19 82 crop growing season, the orange groves
were recovering from the 1981 freeze and produced no marketable
fruit.

That year the O'Rourkes experienced another out-of-pocket

loss of approximately $18,000 for the care of their groves, made
another $12,000 principal payment on the purchase price of the
Eustis property and, in addition, continued to maintain their home
in Miami.

(Ex. P-17 at Response No. 3).
8

By mid-1982, the O'Rourkes realized they could not afford
to begin construction on their Eustis home. Nevertheless, because
they still felt they needed to move out of the Miami area, they
decided to temporarily move to another location in central Florida
(Tr. at 21-22; Ex, P-17

until they could build their Eustis home.

at Response No. 3). They spent approximately seven weeks looking
for a suitable temporary location near the Eustis property, and
physically inspected about 15 properties in the area, all of which
had been pre-screened by their realtor.
Response No. 21) .

(Tr. at 22-23; Ex P-17 at

The O'Rourkes also inspected properties in

several nearby towns. In each case, the properties they inspected
were either too expensive or included too much property.

(Tr. at

22-23; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 21; Ex. P-l).
After reviewing their options, the O'Rourkes decided to
relocate temporarily to the western United States until they could
build their home on the Eustis property.

Their selection criteria

for

a

the

temporary

location

required

city

with

cultural

opportunities, without big city problems, a reasonable weather
pattern, educational and recreational

opportunities and, most

importantly, a city which was on the Eastern Airlines route system
so Mr. O'Rourke could continue commuting to his base of operations.
(Tr. at 23; Ex. P-17 at Response Nos. 3 and 21).

Overall, the

O'Rourkes believed that Salt Lake City's lower cost of living and
housing made it the best choice.

9

In addition, Mr. O'Rourke had a

brother that he had not been close to in several years who lived in
Salt Lake City.

(Tr. at 24; Ex. P-17 at Responses 3 and 21).

(b) The O'Rourkes' Relocation to Utah.

In 1982, the

O'Rourkes sold their home in Miami and purchased a house in Olympus
Cove, a subdivision of Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Olympus house").
(Tr. at 25; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 9). The O'Rourkes purchased
the Olympus house for several reasons, but primarily (i) because
they needed to rollover the gains from the sale of their Miami
home, (ii) buying a house conferred greater tax advantages than
renting a house would, and (iii) Salt Lake City was experiencing a
real estate "boom" and they believed that they could sell the
Olympus house with minimal improvements for a substantial profit,
which could then be used toward the completion of their Florida
home.

(Tr. at 25-26; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 9). Significantly,

at the time the O'Rourkes acquired the Olympus house and at all
times subsequent

thereto, they

intended

to be

in Utah only

temporarily and always had the present intention of returning to
Florida permanently.

(Tr. at 26, 56-57; Ex. P-17 at Response Nos.

3, 5 and 6).
(1) Mr. O'Rourke's Parents' Unexpected Move to Utah.
About

the

time

the

O'Rourkes

bought

the

Olympus

house,

Mr. O'Rourke's parents, who then still lived in Miami, decided to
move to Salt Lake City and occupy the home of Mr. O'Rourke's
brother, who had moved to Boston for two years as part of a
teaching assignment.

When the parents moved into the house, the
10

O'Rourkes made a commitment to them that they would build a home
for them on the Eustis property before the brother's teaching
contract expired in late 1984.

(Tr. at 27-28; Ex. P-17 at Response

No. 9) .
Approximately five months after moving to Boston, however,
Mr. O'Rourke's brother unexpectedly returned to Salt Lake City.
(Tr. at 28; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 9).

Since Mr. O'Rourke's

parents had already sold their Miami home, had nowhere to live, no
income except Social Security, and no life savings except the small
sales proceeds from their home, the O'Rourkes felt obligated to
help them buy a house in Salt Lake City.

(Tr. at 20; Ex. P-17, at

Response No. 9) . Therefore, they refinanced the Olympus house and
purchased a small house in Sandy, Utah (the "Sandy house") for
$50,000.3

The down-payment for the Sandy house was $10,000, with

a 30 year mortgage for the balance.

(Tr. at 29; Ex. P-17 Response

No. 17). The costs of refinancing the Olympus house and carrying
the monthly payments on the Sandy house increased the O'Rourkes'
monthly mortgage obligations from approximately $900 per month to
approximately $1650 per month.

(Tr. at 29, 69).

3

In order to comply with Federal Housing Administration
Regulations regarding the financing for the Sandy house,
Mr. O'Rourke's parents' names were placed on the title.
The
O'Rourkes and their parents agreed that the O'Rourkes would pay the
monthly payments on the Sandy house in return for the parents'
agreement to provide the labor component of any improvements to be
made to it. (Tr. at 31, 69) .
11

(2) Destruction of the 1983 Orange Crop and, in 1984,
the Groves. During this time, the Eustis property continued to be
a financial burden.

In 1983, another "ten-year freeze" killed

approximately one-third of the orange trees and, for the third
straight year, all of the crop.

(Tr. at 30; Ex. P-17 at Response

No. 9) . Although the O'Rourkes had anticipated when they bought
the Eustis property in 1981 that by the end of 1983 they would net
approximately $70,000 from the sales of their orange crops that
they could apply toward the construction of a home, because of the
damage to the crops and trees from the freezes they had no income
from the orange groves and, instead, spent an unanticipated $65,000
to repair the freeze damage.

During this period, the O'Rourkes

also spent several thousand dollars on the Olympus house to improve
its chances for resale.

(Tr. at 31-33, Ex. P-17 at Response No.

9) .
In
O'Rourkes

1984,

several

to realize

that

events

occurred

they would have

which

caused

the

to further delay

construction of their Florida home. First, the Salt Lake City real
estate market entered a decline, so the O'Rourkes could not sell
the Olympus house.

(Tr. at 34).

In addition, central Florida

experienced a "one hundred-year freeze", which destroyed the entire
orange crop and killed all of the trees on the Eustis property.
(Tr. at 33) . To ease their financial situation, the O'Rourkes sold
approximately 10 acres of the Eustis property to a third party.
They used the proceeds of the sale to pay off the mortgage on the
12

remainder of the Eustis property and to make improvements to the
Olympus house to make it more saleable.

(Tr. at 34-36; Ex. 3) . In

1985, the O'Rourkes cleared all dead trees from the property,
spending several thousand dollars in the process.

(Tr. at 36).

(3) Financial Concerns at Work and the Purchase of the
Residence in Lutz. Florida.

In 1986, changes at Mr. O'Rourke's

employer, Eastern Airlines, further complicated the O'Rourkes1
strained financial situation. At that time, Frank Lorenzo and his
affiliates

gained

control of

the

company.

Mr. Lorenzo had

previously gained control of Continental Airlines and, shortly
after

doing

so,

had

substantially

reduced

its

employees'

compensation and tied up their retirement funds in protracted
litigation.

Mr. O'Rourke believed Mr. Lorenzo would implement

similar management strategies at Eastern.4

(Tr. at 37) .

In light of the problems at Eastern Airlines and the
substantial costs of holding the Eustis property, the O'Rourkes
eventually decided to sell it and acquire other property in central
Florida with a home already on it.

(Tr. at 37-38) . Unfortunately,

because the "one-hundred year freeze" killed all the trees on the
Eustis property, its value had substantially declined.

4

(Tr. at

Indeed, after Mr. Lorenzo obtained control of Eastern
Airlines, he immediately instituted programs to improve the
company's cash flow position. These programs included investment
programs under which Eastern's employees were required to purchase
the company's securities, which are now virtually worthless. These
purchase programs resulted in an immediate 20% reduction in Mr.
O'Rourke's gross income. (Tr. at 77).
13

37) . The O'Rourkes eventually sold the Eustis property in 1987 for
a substantial loss.

(Tr. at 38-39, 45-46; Ex. P-4) .

During the O'Rourkes' search for new property in the
Eustis area, Mr. O'Rourke's
Florida.

parents decided

to move back to

(Tr. at 47-48; Ex. P-17 at Response 9). The O'Rourkes

eventually arranged for the purchase of a home in Lutz, Florida
(the "Lutz home"), a city approximately 90 miles from Eustis,
Florida.

(Tr. at 48-49; Ex. P-17 at Response Nos. 9 and 13). They

were unable to return to Florida and occupy the Lutz home, however,
because it needed substantial improvements, because they could not
dispose of their real property in Utah, and, based in part on their
unfulfilled promise to Mr. O'Rourke's parents that they would build
a home for them on the Eustis property, because Mr. O'Rourke's
parents moved into the Lutz home. The Lutz home is a "fixer upper"
and Mr. O'Rourke's parents agreed to make improvements to the home
pending the O'Rourkes' return to Florida (Tr. at 48-49, 75, Ex. p.
17 at Response No. 13).
Because of Mr. O'Rourke's continuing concerns about the
financial stability of Eastern Airlines, particularly the security
of its retirement funds, he retired in November of 1988.

(Tr. at

50, 74). After retiring, he spent the majority of his time making
improvements to the Olympus and Sandy houses.

The O'Rourkes

believed that these improvements were necessary if the houses were
to sell.

This belief was based on the recommendations of their

realtor, who advised them that without substantial improvements,
14

particularly to the Olympus house, they should not place them on
(Tr. at 51, 71) . Upon completing the improvements to

the market.

the houses, the O'Rourkes placed them on the market.

The Olympus

house sold in June of 1989, and the Sandy house eventually sold in
June of 1990.
acquired

for

The O'Rourkes sold the Olympus house, which they
$125,000,

for

$139,000, but

only

after making

approximately $35,000"in improvements. Similarly, the Sandy home,
which the O'Rourkes acquired for $50,000, was sold for $59,000, but
only after the O'Rourkes made approximately $17,000 in improvements
to it.

(Tr. at 50-53, 67, 71-75).
(c) Mr. O'Rourke's Contacts With Utah. During all of

the periods in question, Mr. O'Rourke had only minimal contacts
with Utah.

During his employment with Eastern Airlines, and as

required by federal law, Mr. O'Rourke maintained a detailed log
regarding his flight activities.
duration,

take-off

time,

landing

This log contains the date,
time,

destination point for each of his flights.
12, P-13 and P-14).
log,

beginning

point

and

(Tr. at 54-56; Exs. P-

Based on information contained in this flight

each pilot is required by law to be able to immediately

ascertain whether he is able, based on a complex set of federal
regulations, to fly any flight for which he is scheduled.

(Tr. at

54-56, 98).
Based

on

information

contained

in

these

log books,

MR. O'ROURKE WAS OUTSIDE UTAH AN AVERAGE OF 253 DAYS DURING EACH OF

15

THE YEARS IN QUESTION.5

The log books show that Mr. O'Rourke was

within the State of Utah only approximately 116 days of 1983, 82
days in 1984, 118 days in 1985, 120 days in 1986, 105 days in 1987,
and 125 days in 1988.

(Tr. at 56; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 9; Exs.

P-12, P-13 and P-14) .

These log books also established that,

during the entire period in question, Mr. O'Rourke flew into or out
of the Salt Lake International Airport as a member of a scheduled
flight crew only approximately a dozen times.

(Tr. at 96, 102).

Even on those occasions, he generally stayed with his flight crew
in a hotel near the airport and did not stay with his family.

(Tr.

at 102) .
(d) The O'Rourkes' Continuing Contacts With Florida.
During the periods in question, the O'Rourkes maintained very close
ties with Florida.

For example, during all the periods in

question, and for a number of years prior thereto, the O'Rourkes'
primary banking account was maintained at the Eastern Airlines
Employee Credit Union in Miami, Florida (the "Florida Account").
(Tr. at 57-58; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 20).

Mr. O'Rourke's

paycheck was deposited into the Florida Account by direct deposit.
(Tr. at 58) .

Although the O'Rourkes also maintained auxiliary,

local banking accounts, those accounts were funded by transfers
from the Florida Account.

The amounts transferred from the local

5

The Commission has waived any claim that Mr. O'Rourke was a
resident
of
Utah
for
purposes
of
Utah
Code
Ann.
§ 59-10-103(1) (j) (ii) . (Tr. at 116).
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accounts generally were sufficient only to pay the monthly expenses
of Mrs. O'Rourke and the O'Rourke children in Utah.

(Tr. at 58,

79; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 20). Mr. O'Rourke also maintained a
Florida driver's license during all the periods in question,
belonged

to

sporting

clubs

in

Florida,

maintained

voter

registration in Florida and registered the automobile that he used
at his base of operations in Florida.

(Tr. at 57-59, 80; Ex. P-17

at Response Nos. 14, 17, 18 and 19; Ex. P-15).
Further, during the periods in question, the O'Rourkes
spent considerable time in Florida.

They averaged at least three

trips there each year for week-long fishing trips, traveled there
on several occasions for parties with friends, traveled there
several times on holidays for approximately one week at a time and
spent at least two weeks there during most summers for vacations.
In addition, Mr. O'Rourke went to Florida for the specific purpose
of visiting the Eustis Property approximately 16 times during the
periods

in

question,

and

also

visited

the

Eustis

property

approximately ten more times when he visited friends in the Eustis
area. Mr. O'Rourke also went to the Tampa area to look for housing
approximately eight times in 1987 prior to the purchase of the Lutz
Home, and visited with his sister in Miami approximately 25 times
during the periods in question.
Response No. 24) .
Florida.

(Tr. at 59, 102; Ex. P-17 at

The O'Rourkes also paid substantial taxes to

For example, during the periods in question, they paid

17

$3,662 to Dade County, $3,046 to Lake County, and $358 to Pascoe
County, Florida.6

(Ex. P-17 at Response No. 16) .

Finally, although Mrs. O'Rourke engaged in some activities
in Utah arguably associated with the establishment of a domicile,
she did so only because she was required to do so by law and not
with the intent to move the O'Rourkes' affairs to Utah.

For

example, Mrs. O'Rourke obtained a Utah driver's license in 1982,
but did so only because she understood that, as a driver of an
automobile in Utah on more than on an infrequent basis, she needed
to obtain a Utah driver's license.
Response

No.

18) .

Similarly,

(Tr. at 85, 59; Ex. P-17 at
although

the

O'Rourkes

owned

automobiles which they registered in Utah, the vehicles were
registered here only because of their understanding that vehicles
used on the state's highways other than on an infrequent basis are
required to be registered in the state.
Response

No.

17) .

The

automobiles

(Tr. at 80-81; Ex. P-17 at
were

O'Rourke's name because of insurance reasons.

registered

in Mr.

(Tr. at 101).

(e) The Commission's Prior Determination Regarding the
O'Rourkes' Residency Status.

In September of 19 88, the O'Rourkes

received a letter from Mr. Robert N. Laird, an income tax auditor
with

the

Commission,

assessment for 1984.

regarding

a proposed

state

(Tr. at 60; Ex. P-16) .

income

tax

Shortly after

receiving the letter, Mr. O'Rourke met with Mr. Laird in the
6

Florida does not have an income tax on individuals, only
corporations. See, Florida Statutes § 220, et seq. (1989).
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Commission's offices with Mr. Laird.

At Mr. Laird's request,

Mr. O'Rourke provided the Commission with evidence showing that the
O'Rourkes were residents of Florida.
After

reviewing

that

(Tr. at 60, 61).

evidence, Mr.

Laird

wrote

the

initials "N/A" for "Not Applicable" in the upper right-hand corner
of the letter, and informed Mr. O'Rourke that, based on his review
of the facts, the O'Rourkes were not residents of Utah. Mr. Laird
further informed Mr. O'Rourke that, if the O'Rourkes received
letters from the Commission regarding their residency status for
other years, they should contact him and that he would make sure
that the problem was resolved in their favor.

(Tr. at 60-61; Ex.

P-16) .
Mr. Laird's determination in the case was subsequently
reviewed by Mr. Brent Barney, the Income Tax Audit Manager for the
Auditing Division of the Commission.

(Tr. at 110). Mr. Barney did

not reprimand or admonish Mr. Laird regarding his disposition of
the O'Rourkes'

case, nor did he, in any way,

conclusion that Mr. Laird reached in the matter.

question the

(Tr. at 110).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

In its Final Decision, the Commission held that the

O'Rourkes voluntarily abandoned their domicile in Florida as a
result of their extended absence from that state and because the
O'Rourkes' intent to return to Florida constituted only a hope of
some future expectation.

However, temporary residence outside of
19

a domicile, even for an extended period of years, does not result
in an abandonment of the original domicile, as long as there is an
absence of any present intention of residing in the newly alleged
domicile permanently or indefinitely.

Further, as long as the

O'Rourkes' intention to return to Florida was based upon the
occurrence of an event which could be reasonably anticipated to
occur, that intent cannot be deemed to be an "indeterminate-11 or
"floating intent" requiring a finding that they abandoned their
domicile in Florida. Accordingly, the Commission's holding must be
reversed.
2.

The Commission had the burden of production to show

that the O'Rourkes abandoned their domicile in Florida, and was
required to show that the O'Rourkes did so by clear and convincing
evidence. The Commission produced no such evidence at the Hearing,
and so the Commission's decision that the O'Rourkes abandon their
domicile in Florida cannot be sustained.
3.

The Commission's decision is based in part on a

determination that the O'Rourkes were domiciled in Utah because
Mrs. O'Rourke and the O'Rourke children were present in the state.
Since a wife's domicile is determined by the domicile of her
husband as a matter of law and a husband's domicile is where his
family resides only if he intends that place to be the permanent or
indefinite residence of the family, the Commission's determination
was in error.

Moreover, even if Mrs. O'Rourke and the O'Rourke

children were residents of Utah during the periods in question,
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that does not preclude the fact that Mr. O'Rourke was domiciled in
Florida, since a husband and wife may have separate domiciles and
may be residents of different states for tax purposes.
4.

In reviewing the decisions of the Commission, this

Court must consider and review the whole record before it and
consider

not

only

the

evidence

supporting

the

Commission's

findings, but also the evidence that detracts from the weight of
the Commission's evidence. Under this standard, there is no doubt
that the Commission's findings were not supported by substantial
evidence based on the whole record, and those findings must be
reversed.
5.

At the Hearing, and in its post-hearing brief, the

O'Rourkes argued that the Commission is precluded from assessing
taxes against them for the periods in question as a result of the
Commission's actions in September of 1988, when it determined that
the O'Rourkes were not residents of Utah for tax purposes.

This

issue, however, was not even addressed by the Commission in its
Final Decision.

Since the import of the Commission's actions in

1988 was a material issue which, if held in the O'Rourkes' favor,
would preclude the Commission from assessing taxes against the
O'Rourkes

for some

or all

of

the periods

in question, the

Commission's failure to make any findings with respect to that
issue was reversible error.
6.

In September of 1988, the Commission, after due

investigation, determined that the O'Rourkes were not residents of
21

Utah for the year 1984.
determination.

The Commission should be bound by this

In addition, because the Commission had notice and

knowledge of the O'Rourkes' filing status for all of the years 19 82
through 1987 at the time of that determination, the Commission's
conclusion that the O'Rourkes were not residents of Utah in 19 84 is
evidence that the Commission waived assessment of taxes against the
O'Rourkes for any subsequent periods. Even assuming the Commission
waived action only with respect to 1984, its determination in 1988
that the O'Rourkes were not residents in 19 84 necessarily precludes
it from finding they were residents of Utah for tax purposes in any
other year, unless it was able to show that there was a fundamental
change in the O'Rourkes' circumstances which would require that
their

nonresident

status

be

changed.

Finally, because

the

O'Rourkes reasonably relied to their detriment on the Commission's
statements regarding their residency status, the Commission should
be precluded from assessing penalties or interest for the periods
in question even if the O'Rourkes are held to be residents for tax
purposes during those periods.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE O'ROURKES
WERE DOMICILED IN UTAH DURING THE PERIODS IN QUESTION
A.

The Commission Erred in Determining That The O'Rourkes

Abandoned Their Domicile in Florida.

In its Final Decision, the

Commission held that the O'Rourkes voluntarily abandoned their
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domicile in Florida as a result of their extended absence from the
state and because their intention to return there constituted
"nothing more than mere hopes of some future expectation, the date
and occurrence of which was unknown,"

Final Decision at 7.

This

conclusion, however, is based upon a misapprehension of black
letter domicile law, and should be reversed as a matter of law.
Since at least as early as 1875, courts have uniformly
held that a person does not abandon his established domicile, even
if he is absent from it for a period of years, if there is no
intent to stay in the new locality.

One of the first, and perhaps

most succinct, discussions of this principle was given by the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Mitchell v. United
States. 88 U.S. 350 (1875), where the Court stated that:
A domicil once acquired is presumed to continue
until it is shown to have been changed . . . .
If a change of domicil is alleged, the burden of
proving it rests upon the person making the
allegation . . . . To constitute a new domicil,
two things are indispensable: First, residence
in the new locality; and second, the intention
to remain there . . . .
Mere absence from a
fixed home, however long continued, cannot work
the change. There must be animus to change the
prior domicil for another. Until the new is
acquired, the old one remains . . . .
These
principles are axiomatic in the law upon the
subject.
Since that time, every court which has addressed the issue
has followed the holding reach in Mitchell. See, e.g.. Messersmith
v. Matteucci. 276 F.Supp. 310, 312 (E.D. Ca. 1966) aff 'd per curium
385 F.2d 1023

(9th Cir. 1967)

(quoting Mitchell) .
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See also.

Petition

of

Oaanesoff.

20

F.2d

978

(D.C.

S.D.

Cal.

1927)

(established domicile not lost by temporary residence elsewhere,
even for a period of years), People v. Chrysler, 265 P. 92 (Colo.
1928) (citing Jain v. Bossen, 62 P. 194 (Colo. 1900), for the
proposition that temporary residence outside of domicile, even for
an extended period of several years, does not affect original
domicile); Rhoades v. Rhoades, 182 P.2d
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(Cal. 1947}- (no

abandonment of original domicile even after extensive residence
elsewhere) ; Utah Tax Commission Rule R865-9-2I ("domicile" does not
include habitation in a particular place for a mere special or
temporary purpose).
The principles enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in Mitchell were later followed in Coca Cola International
Corp. v. New York Trust Company, 8 A.2d 511 (Del. 1939), rev'd sub
nom New York Trust Company v. Riley, 16 A.2d 772 (Del. 1940)
(hereinafter "Riley"), a case upon which the Commission relied in
pleadings filed earlier in this action. See Answer to Petition For
Redetermination and Notice, at p. 2.

In Riley, the Coca Cola

Company brought an interpleader action in Delaware against an
estate's

New

York

administrator

to

determine

whether

stock

certificates should be issued to the estate's Georgia executor or
to its New York administrator.

The resolution of the issue

depended upon whether the deceased, Mrs. Hungerford, was legally
domiciled in Georgia or New York at her death.
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Mrs. Hungerford was a resident of Atlanta, Georgia, who
married Mr. Hungerford, a resident of New York City, in 1932.
Between the time of the Hungerfords' marriage and Mrs. Hungerford's
death in 1935, the couple spent almost all of their time in
Atlanta,

Georgia.

The

couple

returned

to

New

York

only

infrequently and for short periods of time, generally staying at
hotels and registering as residents of Atlanta.
Hungerfords

owned

any

real

property

in

Neither of the
New

Mrs. Hungerford owned an elaborate home in Atlanta.

York,

but

The couple

made extensive improvements to this home, and had made plans for
even grander improvements before Mrs. Hungerford died.

While the

couple was in Georgia, Mr. Hungerford joined several country clubs
in the Atlanta area, used the Atlanta home as his address, and
changed his New York club memberships to nonresident status. The
Hungerfords also filed federal and state income taxes from Atlanta,
prepared and executed wills in the state, registered and drove cars
there and showed Georgia as their home on their stationery and
various business correspondence.
Based on these facts, the lower court concluded that
Mr. Hungerford had made Atlcinta his home and had intended to
continue to make it his home for an indefinite period of time. The
lower court characterized Mr. Hungerford's intent to return to New
York at some future time as "a mere hope or wish of an indefinite,
or so-called floating nature," and held that the Hungerfords had
abandoned whatever claim they had to a domicile in New York.
25

Id.

at 528-

This was the proposition for which the Commission

originally cited the case and apparently was one of the bases for
the

Commission's

domicile

holding

in Florida,

that

since

the O'Rourkes

the

Commission

abandoned

their

characterized

the

O'Rourkes' intent to return to Florida as "nothing more than mere
hopes of some future expectation, the date and occurrence of which
was unknown."
On

Final" Decision at 7.
appeal,

however,

the

Delaware

Supreme

Court

specifically addressed the "floating intent" theory espoused by the
lower court

(and apparently relied upon by the Commission in

rendering its Final Decision), and found the lower court's theory
to be incorrect as a matter of law.

The Delaware Supreme Court

held that, notwithstanding Mr. Hungerford's substantial contacts in
Georgia, a person's domicile, once established, remains the legal
domicile of that person until a new domicile is acquired.

To

establish a new domicile, there must be a concurrence of an
individual's physical presence at a place and the intention to make
that place home. The absence of either element precludes a change
in domicile:
There must be an actual abandonment of this
first domicile coupled with an intention not to
return to it, and the acquisition of a new
domicile by actual residence in another place
with the intention of making that place a
permanent home. Whether one has changed his
domicile from one place to another must depend
largely on his intention. The intention must be
of permanent or indefinite living at a given
place, not for mere temporary or special
purposes, but with a present intention of making
26

that place home unless or until something
uncertain or unexpected shall induce the
adoption of some other permanent home; or,
negatively expressed, there must be an absence
of any present intention of not residing at the
place permanently or for an indefinite time. It
follows that absence from one's place of
residence, even for a long time on business,
pleasure or reasons of health, education of
children or other special purpose, will not
effect a change of domicile if, all the while,
the person intends to be absent only for the
accomplishment of a temporary purpose and to
return to his former place of residence upon the
fulfillment of the purpose.
Id. at 783-84.
In light of the similarity between the facts in the Riley
case and the O'Rourkes' case, it is obvious why the Commission
failed to acknowledge in its pleadings that the Riley case was
reversed on appeal and apparently based its Final Decision on only
the lower court opinion.

Like Mr. Hungerford in the Riley case,

the O'Rourkes have continually, and without exception, maintained
that their presence in Utah was temporary and that they intended to
return to Florida. As in Riley, the O'Rourkes' absence from their
domicile in Florida was only for "the accomplishment of a temporary
purpose" -- until they could acquire a home in Florida and return
to that state.
The rationale for finding that the O'Rourkes maintained
their

original

domicile

in

Florida,

however,

is

even

more

compelling than the factual basis for the Riley court's holding
that Mr. Hungerford retained his original domicile. In contrast to
the Riley case, the O'Rourkes owned and maintained extensive real

property in Florida, and spent enormous sums there in an attempt to
rehabilitate it to the point that the proceeds from its operations
would finance the construction of their home there.
inclement

weather,

unfavorable

real

estate

Although

markets, adverse

employment factors and poor financial decisions continually forced
the O'Rourkes to postpone their plans to return to Florida, the
unrebutted evidence in this case is that the O'Rourkes' intent to
return to Florida was fixed and permanent and that Utah was only a
temporary location for Mrs. O'Rourke and the children. Tr. at 26,
56-57; Ex. p. 17 at Response Nos. 3, 5 and 6.

Unlike the Riley

case, where the Hungerfords spent substantial sums to improve their
real property in Georgia in order to make it more liveable, the
uncontested evidence in this case is that the O'Rourkes made the
improvements to the Olympus and Sandy houses primarily for the
purpose of making them more marketable and to facilitate their
return to Florida.

See, Tr. at 25-26, 31-33.

In contrast to the facts in Riley, during the periods in
question, the entire O'Rourke family spent considerable time in
Florida, Mr. O'Rourke was only infrequently in Utah, and the
O'Rourkes maintained substantial and continuous contacts with
Florida.

See, Tr. at 56, 59, 102; Ex. p. 17 at Response Nos. 18,

19, 24 and 26.

The O'Rourkes obtained and maintained driver's

licenses in Florida, opened and used bank accounts (including their
main bank account, the Florida Account), registered their cars,
voted, and paid taxes in Florida.
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Tr. at 57-59, 80; Ex. P-17 at

Response Nos. 16 and 24. Except where the O'Rourkes believed they
were required by law to take those actions in Utah - - such as the
O'Rourke's understanding that all nonoccasional users of Utah roads
are required to obtain Utah driver's licenses and register their
cars in the state -- they continued these actions in Florida after
their arrival in Utah and during the entire period in question.
See Tr. at 80-81.

The O'Rourkes' actions throughout all of the

periods in question were consistent with their expressed intent to
maintain a domicile in Florida.
Further, since the O'Rourkes7

intention to return to

Florida was based upon the occurrence of an event which could be
reasonably anticipated to occur, that intent cannot be deemed to be
an "indeterminate" or "floating intent" requiring a finding that
they abandoned their domicile in Florida.

For example, when the

O'Rourkes acquired the Eustis property, they were informed that the
orange groves would generate substantial net income, which could
then be used for the construction of the home on the Eustis
property.

Tr. at 19; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 3.

When they

relocated to Utah and during the periods in question, it was
reasonable

for them to believe that the Eustis groves would

generate sufficient income to provide for the construction of a
home

on

the Eustis property

and

their

return

there.

Only

unanticipated and highly unlikely events (such as the unprecedented
series

of

hard

freezes

in Florida, Mr. O'Rourke's

brother's

unexpected return to Utah, Mr. Lorenzo's acquisition of the control
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of Eastern Airlines, Mr. O'Rourke's parents7 unexpected return to
Florida and the sudden downturn in the Utah real estate market)
prevented the O'Rourkes from returning to Florida.

Indeed, each

decision made by the O'Rourkes during the periods in question was
designed to make their return to Florida a reality. The O'Rourkes
invested substantial sums in their Eustis property for the specific
purpose of generating income to build their home there.

They

bought the Lutz house to fix up and occupy when they were forced to
sell their Eustis property.

And, they bought and improved their

Olympus house because they believed those actions would provide
them with substantial returns they could use for the construction
of their Florida house.

See Gates v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue,

199 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1952) (intention of taxpayer to return to
original home when he has acquired sufficient business experience
to manage a business is an intention based on an event which may be
reasonably

anticipated

and

is not

a

floating

or

indefinite

intention; four year absence from original domicile); McDowell v.
Friedmen Bros. Shoe Company, 115 S.W. 1028 (Mo. 1909) (family which
gives up residence in one city and moves to another for two years
with hope that warmer climate will be beneficial to daughter's
health does not lose domicile in the first city, if in leaving and
while remaining away, they have the intent of returning to first
city when daughter's health improves). Accordingly, there was no
basis

for determining

that

the O'Rourkes

had a

floating or

indefinite intent to return to Florida, and the Commission erred
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when it determined that the O'Rourkes abandoned their domicile in
Florida and obtained a new domicile in Utah.7
B.

The Commission Did Not Show By Clear and Convincing

Evidence That the O'Rourkes Abandoned Their Domicile in Florida.
The courts have long recognized that a person's original domicile
is favored over an alleged new domicile, and have generally held
that the burden of production with respect to a change in domicile
ultimately rests with the party asserting that change and that any
such change must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. See,
Elwert v. Elwert. 248 P.2d 847 (Ore. 1952); Valley National Bank of
Phoenix v. Siebrand. 243 P.2d

771

Jizmeiian, 492 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1972).
25 Am.Jur.2d Domicile § 86.

(Ariz. 1952); Jizmeiian v.
See also, 36 A.L.R.2d 741;

In Paulsen v. Coombs, 254 P.2d 621,

624 (Utah 1953), this Court defined "clear and convincing evidence"
to be such evidence that there is "no serious nor substantial

7

Further, the O'Rourkes' situation can be easily distinguished
from "indefinite intention" Ccises such as Allen v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc. . 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978). In Allen, this Court addressed
domicile concepts in the context of a personal injury suit, and
held that the plaintiff was not domiciled in Utah where she had
physically moved to another state and had the intention of
remaining there indefinitely. This Court indicated that, where a
person is physically present in a location, the intent to remain
there permanently need not be necessary to create a domicile in
that place as long as the person intends to remain there
indefinitely.
The O'Rourkes, in contrast, although physically
present in Utah, never had the intention of remaining in the state
permanently or even indefinitely. Rather, based on the clear and
unrebutted evidence, they at all times had the present intentionof
remaining in Utah only for a specific and temporary period of time
-- until they could build their home in Florida and return there.
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doubt" regarding the proposition for which the proof is offered.
This standard of proof is something more than the usual requirement
of a preponderance of the evidence, but something less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt- Child v. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 986 (Utah
1958).

Accordingly, the Commission's holding that the O'Rourkes'

domicile changed from Florida to Utah during the periods in
question necessarily required the Commission to produce evidence
sufficient in scope, nature and weight that no reasonable person
reviewing the evidence would have any substantial doubt that the
O'Rourkes did, in fact, abandon their domicile in Florida.8
8

At the Hearing, hearing officer Iwasaki noted that, as the
petitioners in the case, the O'Rourkes had the "burden of proof".
See Tr. at 6-7.
See also, Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-543; Tax
Under general evidentiary law,
Commission Rule R861-1-7A(G).
however, the term "burden of proof" generally connotes two
different concepts: (1) the burden of persuasion, which, under the
traditional view, does not shift from one party to the other, and
(2) the burden of going forward with the evidence, which may shift
back and forth between the parties as the trial progresses. See,
Exchange National Bank of Colorado Springs v. Sparkman, 554 P.2d
1090 (Colo. 1976); Koesling v. Basanakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah
1975); Palicka v. Rath Fisher School District No. 90 of Meracopa
County, 473 P.2d 807 (Ariz. 1970); Bowen v. Hathaway, 446 P.2d 723
(Kan. 1968). Once a party establishes a prima facie case, the
burden of going forward with rebutting evidence then shifts to the
other party.
See, Palicka, supra.
See also, Willinaham v.
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 377 F.Supp 1254 (D.C.
S.D. Fla. 1974); Goodman v. Brock, 498 P.2d 676 (N.M. 1972). These
concepts also apply in domicile cases. Messersmith v. Matteucci.
276 F.Supp 310 (E.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd per curium 385 F.2d 1023
(9th Cir. 1967). See Utah Code Ann. §59-10-543. Accordingly, upon
a prima facie showing that the O'Rourkes were domiciled in Florida,
the "burden of proof" -- in this case, the burden of production -shifted to the Commission to establish at what point the O'Rourkes'
domicile changed to Utah. As noted in the text, in overcoming the
O'Rourkes' prima facie showing of a domicile in Florida, the
Commission had to necessarily overcome the presumption that, once
a domicile is established, it is presumed to continue until a
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At the Hearing, the Commission produced absolutely no
evidence that the O'Rourkes abandoned their domicile in Florida,
and merely cross-examined Mr. O'Rourke about several matters he
testified to in his direct examination. These matters included the
O'Rourkes7 acquisition of real property in Utah, their improvements
to that property, Mrs. O'Rourke's acquisition of a driver's license
in Utah, the O'Rourkes' registration of some (but not all) of their
automobiles
Florida.

in Utah and their voluntarily move to Utah from

This was the sole evidence produced by the Commission,

and it was not sufficient under the "clear and convincing" standard
to show that the O'Rourkes abandoned their Florida domicile since
any presumption of a change in domicile with respect to those
matters was effectively rebutted by Mr. O'Rourke's other testimony
regarding these same matters.
The unrebutted testimony of Mr. O'Rourke established that
the O'Rourkes registered their cars in Utah and that Mrs. O'Rourke
obtained a license in the state only because the O'Rourkes believed
that those actions were required by law of persons who used Utah
roadways other than on an infrequent basis.

Similarly, the

O'Rourkes bought real property in Utah because they had to rollover
their gain from the sale of their Miami house, and because they
believed they could make a quick profit on the property, which they
could use toward the construction of their Florida home.

change is clearly shown.

See, Jizmeiian. at 1212.
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Tr. at

25-26; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 17.

They made improvements to

their real property in Utah in the hope that those improvements
would make those properties more attractive to potential buyers and
provide them with a greater return on their investment in the real
property - - a return which could be used towards construction of
their home in Florida.

Id. Any inference that the O'Rourkes took

those actions because they considered Utah as their permanent place
of abode is incorrect in light of the record.
Finally, the Commission's reliance on the O'Rourkes'
intentional move to Salt Lake as evidence of their abandonment of
their Florida domicile is similarly misplaced, since it confuses
free choice with an intent to remain permanently or indefinitely in
a place. Under the Commission's rationale, a person's intentional
choice to visit Disneyland, accompanied by his concurrent physical
presence there, would change his domicile to the Magic Kingdom.
This Court's holdings in cases such as Allen v. Greyhound Lines.
Inc.. 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978), clearly require otherwise.
C.
Presence

The Commission Erred When It Determined That The

of Mrs. O'Rourke

in Utah

Constituted

a

Basis

Determining that the O'Rourkes were Domiciled in Utah.

for

In its

Final Decision, the Commission also based its decision on a finding
that,

because

Mrs. O'Rourke

and

the

O'Rourke

children were

physically present in Utah during the periods in question, Mr.
O'Rourke's domicile was in Utah. See, Final Decision at pp. 7 and
8.

Any inference that Mr. O'Rourke was domiciled in Utah because
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his

family

was

temporarily

here

would

be

in

conflict

with

established domiciliary law, which holds that a wife's domicile, as
a matter of law, is determined by the domicile of her husband.
Moreover, a wife's and children's physical presence in a particular
place does not determine a husband's domicile if the husband has no
intention of making that place the family's permanent home. See.
e.g.. 28 C.J.S. Domicile at §§ 12 and 16(b) (wife's domicile is
determined by domicile of husband as a matter of law; husband's
domicile is determined by location of wife and children only if the
family residence is a permanent home and not merely for transient
purposes); Petition of Correa. 79 F.Supp. 265 (W.D. Tex. 1948)
(man's residence may be where family resides if family resides at
a place where they intend to stay permanently); Broadstone Realty
Corp. v. Evans. 213 F.Supp. 261 (D.C. N.Y. 1962) aff'd 367 F.2d 397
(2d. Cir. 1963) (man's residence may be where family resides, if
that is at a home intended to be permanent) ; Glue v. Klein, 197
N.W. 691

(wife's domicile determined by husband's); Bialac v.

Bialac, 386 P.2d 852 (Ariz. 1963) (domicile of wife determined by
domicile of husband); Small v. Small. 407 P.2d 491 (Kan. 1965)
(wife's domicile is domicile of husband). In each case, the courts
have emphasized that, even if a man's family is present in a place,
the family does not relinquish its old domicile unless and until
the husband has the actual intention of making the purportedly new
domicile the family's permanent home.
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See also. Riley at 783-84.

In the instant case, the presence of Mr. O'Rourke's family
in Utah was an indication that the O'Rourkes abandoned their
domicile in Florida and obtained a new domicile in Utah if, and
only if, the record clearly shows that Mr. O'Rourke had the actual
intention of making Utah his family's permanent place of residence.
The uncontroverted testimony offered at the Hearing and in the
sworn responses to the interrogatories propounded by the Commission
is directly to the contrary.

The record clearly shows that (i)

Mr. O'Rourke moved his family to Utah only for a temporary purpose;
(ii) neither he nor Mrs. O'Rourke ever intended to make Utah their
permanent home; and (iii) instead, they always intended to return
to Florida upon the construction of their home there.9 See Tr. at
26, 56-57; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 3.
During the entire period that his family was physically
present in Utah, Mr. O'Rourke maintained minimal contacts with
Utah, but maintained extensive contacts with and in Florida. These
contacts
associated

included

all

of

the

incidents

with a domicile, including

of

contact

normally

the ownership

of real

property, the use and registration of an automobile, maintenance of

9

Further, if this Court finds that Mrs. O'Rourke and the
O'Rourke children were residents of Utah during the periods in
question, that still should not preclude a finding that Mr.
O'Rourke was domiciled in Florida, since a husband and wife may
have separate domiciles and may be residents of different states
for tax purposes. See 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 12(d) at 24-25 (wife
may acquire domicile separate and apart from husband). See also,
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-119 (1987) (recognizing the concept of
husbands and wives with separate residences for tax purposes).
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a

driver's license, voter registration, and being physically

present within the state for substantial periods of time.
D.

The Commission's Final Decision Is Not Supported By

Substantial Evidence Based on the Whole Record.

In Grace Drilling

Company v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the
Utah Court of Appeals stated that, when reviewing the decisions of
administrative bodies to determine if a decision is supported by
the evidence, this Court must consider and review the whole record
before it and consider not only the evidence supporting the
administrative body's findings, but also the evidence that detracts
from the weight of the administrative body's evidence. Under this
standard, there is no doubt that the Commission's determination
that

the

O'Rourkes

abandoned

their

Florida

domicile

is not

supportable by the evidence.
During

the entire period

in question, the O'Rourkes

retained their intention to return to Florida. Their intention was
fixed, certain and constant, and was evidenced by, and consistent
with, their actions:

They owned and maintained extensive real

property in Florida; Mr. O'Rourke maintained voter registration in
Florida; held a valid Florida driver's license throughout the
entire period in question and belonged to sports clubs; they
registered automobiles in the state; they maintained their primary
banking accounts there; they paid property taxes in Florida; and
they spent substantial time there.

Their intent to return to

Florida is further evidenced by the fact that they spent well over
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$100,000 during the periods in question for the sole purpose of
repairing

and maintaining

their orange groves on the Eustis

property with the intent of rehabilitating the property and using
the proceeds of its operations to construct a home there.
Further, the unrebutted testimony of Mr. O'Rourke is that
the O'Rourkes never had the intent to remain permanently or
indefinitely in Utah: Tr. at 26, 56-57; Ex. P-17 at Response Nos.
3, 5 and 6. Without the requisite intent, no amount of physical or
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a holding that the
O'Rourkes acquired Utah as their domicile, even if the Commission
had produced any.
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(Az. 1972)

See Arizona Bd. of Regents v. Harper. 495 P.2d
(must be concurrence of both actual physical

presence in a location and an intention to remain there permanently
or indefinitely); Allen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 583 P.2d 613
(Utah 1978) (concurrence of physical presence ami intent to remain
permanently or indefinitely required).

The Commission had ample

opportunity to challenge or discredit Mr. O'Rourke's testimony
during the Hearing, but failed to do so.

Therefore, it was an

abuse of discretion for the Commission to ignore Mr. O'Rourke's
sworn testimony and find that the O'Rourkes formed the requisite
intent to become domiciled in Utah when the only evidence regarding
intent was to the contrary.
The Commission' -i decision

is nlso

in error since it

resulted in the assessment of taxes against the O'Rourkes for all
of the periods in question without any discussion or findings as to
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when the O'Rourkes' domicile changed from Florida to Utah.

See 85

C.J.S. Taxation § 1092 (noting that only a resident is liable for
taxes, and if a nonresident

during any of periods for which

assessment is sought, assessment is not proper).

As noted above,

in order for a domicile to be established, there must be a
concurrence of physical presence and intent to remain in that place
permanently

or indefinitely.

Regents, supra.

See. Allen and Arizona Bd. of

In order for the Commission to hold that the

O'Rourkes were residents of Utah for tax purposes during all the
periods in question, the Commission necessarily found that the
O'Rourkes intended from the moment they entered Utah in 19 82 to
remain here permanently or indefinitely.

The evidence is clearly

to the contrary, and the Commission offered absolutely no evidence
which would establish when, or if, the O'Rourkes' intent changed so
as to subject them to taxation.
II.
THE COMMISSION IS PRECLUDED FROM CLAIMING
THE O'ROURKES WERE RESIDENTS FOR INCOME TAX
PURPOSES DURING THE PERIODS IN QUESTION
A.

The Commission Erred in Not Addressing the Effects of

Its Earlier Determination Regarding the O'Rourkes' Residency Status
for Tax Purposes. At the Hearing, Mr. O'Rourke testified that, in
September of 1988, the Commission notified him by letter of a
proposed state income tax assessment for the year 1984.

After

receiving the letter, he met with Mr. Robert Laird, an income tax
auditor for the Commission and provided him with proof that the
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O'Rourkes were residents of Florida.

At the conclusion of that

meeting, Mr. Laird informed Mr. O'Rourke that, based on his review
of the facts and the evidence submitted fay Mr. O'Rourke, the
O'Rourkes were not residents of Utah in 1984.

Mr. Laird further

stated that if the O'Rourkes subsequently received any other
letters from the Commission questioning their residency status,
they should contact him again, and that he would make sure that the
problem was promptly resolved in their favor.
At the Hearing, Mr. Brent Barney, the income tax audit
manager for the Commission, also gave testimony

regarding Mr.

O'Rourkes' 1988 meeting with the Commission. Mr. Barney testified
that, among other things, he had reviewed Mr. Laird's actions at
that meeting and had not reprimanded or admonished him for his
actions,

nor

did

he

question

his

conclusions

regarding

the

0'Rourkes' residency status.
Despite the testimony regarding this issue at the Hearing,
and without regard to the extensive arguments the O'Rourkes raised
in

their

post-Hearing

brief

regarding

the

import

of

the

Commission's 1988 actions, the Final Decision does not address,
either factually or legally, the effects of the Commission's 1988
determination.

The Final Decision is completely silent on the

issue.
This Court has repeatedly held that the failure of a
judicial body to make a finding on a material issue arising at
trial constitutes reversible error, especially when the evidence
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introduced as to that issue is sufficient to find in favor of the
complaining party.

See Romrel v. Zions First National Bank H.A.,

611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980); Boyer Co. v. Lignell. 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah
1977); Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233

(Utah 1983); Duncan v.

Hemmelwriaht. 186 P.2d 965 (Utah 1947).

Since, as described in

Section IIB, infra, the import of the Commission's actions in 1988
was a material issue which was addressed extensively at the Hearing
(and in the O'Rourkes' post-Hearing brief) and which, if held in
the O'Rourkes' favor, precluded the Commission from assessing
income taxes against the O'Rourkes for all or some of the periods
in question, the Commission's failure to make any findings with
respect to that issue constitutes reversible error.
B.

The

Commission's

1988 Actions

Precludes

it From

Claiming the O'Rourkes are Residents for Income Tax Purposes During
the Periods in Question. As noted above, in September of 1988, Mr.
O'Rourke met with Mr. Laird to discuss the specific issue of
whether the O'Rourkes were residents of Utah for state income tax
purposes. In conducting his investigation regarding the O'Rourkes'
residency status, Mr. Laird was charged with the responsibility and
authority

to investigate

surrounding

the

all of the facts and

O'Rourkes'

residency

circumstances

status, and

his

review

authority included the authority to examine all of their pertinent
documents, books, papers, records, memoranda, and such other proof
as he deemed proper in order to verify or establish if the
O'Rourkes were Utah residents.

See Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-544
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(1987) (describing general powers and duties of the Commission) .
In exercise of this authority, and after such investigation as he
believed was necessary under the circumstances, Mr. Laird concluded
that

the O'Rourkes

were not

residents

of Utah

in 1984.

The

Commission should be bound by this determination.
Under the circumstances, Mr. Laird's actions constituted
evidence of a'waiver"by the Commission of any assessment of taxes
against the O'Rourkes for any of the periods in question.
the

meeting

took

place

in

late

1988,

the

constructive or actual notice of the O'Rourkes
the years 1982 through 1987.10

Commission

Since
had

filing status foi

Mr. Laird's conclusion (which was

based on such review of the facts as he deemed necessary under the
circumstances) that the O'Rourkes were not residents of Utah in
1984, and his assurances that they would not be deemed residents in
any subsequent year, cons t i tu 1: ed an adiiii s s i on by the Commi s s ion
that the O'Rourkes were not residents of Utah during any period in
question.
The Commission's admissi on that no cla im relatd ng to the
O'Rourkes' residency status was warranted is further supported by
Mr. Barney's testimony, which indicates that after Mr. Laird's
meeting with Mr. O'Rourke, Mr. Barney reviewed Mr, Laird's actions

10

Mr. Barney, the Income Tax Audit Manager for the Commission,
testified at the Hearing that the computer program which identified
the O'Rourkes' return as "suspect" for the year 1984 also
identified them as "suspect" for the years 1985, 1986, 1987 and
1988. Tr. at 109.
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and did not reprimand or otherwise admonish him for any action that
he took at the meeting or for any violation of the Commission's
regulations or internal procedures in handling the O'Rourkes' case.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Commission's actions in
1988 was an admission only with respect to 1984, its findings that
the O'Rourkes were not Utah residents in that year necessarily
precludes a finding that they were residents for tax purposes in
other years unless the Commission was able to show that there was
a fundamental change in the O'Rourkes' circumstances during another
tax year which required that their non-resident status be changed.
The Commission

introduced absolutely

no evidence which would

support such a finding, and any conclusion by the Commission to
that effect would be without basis and an abuse of discretion.
The concept of "finality" is one which is well recognized
in equity and at law, and should be applied in this case.

The

ability of the Commission to continually reexamine cases its duly
authorized agents have previously disposed of until it spots some
avenue of attack must be subject to the same limitation. Judicial
economy and fair play suggests nothing less.

In light of Mr.

Laird's express statements to Mr. O'Rourke at the meeting in 1988,
and in light of the Commission's broad power to conduct further
investigations at that time into the O'Rourkes' residency status if
there had been any question as to that status, the Commission
should be bound by its prior determination and be barred from
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assessing any taxes, penalties or interest against the O'Rourkes
for the periods in question.11
Finally, based on Mr. Laird's representations at the 1988
meeting, the O'Rourkes understood that the Commission did not
dispute that they were residents of Florida.

If Mr. Laird had

questioned the O'Rourkes' residency status for tax purposes at that
time, the O'Rourkes "could have filed i: eturns for the periods in
question and then sought a refund for the taxes paid if they wished
to pursue the residency issue.

Instead, and in reliance on the

Commission's representations, the O'Rourkes did not file their
returns and the Commission is now seeking penalties and increased
interest for those periods.

Because the O'Rourkes reasonably

relied to their detriment upon the statements of the Commission,
even if they were to be deemed to be residents of Utah for the
periods in question, the Commission should n^w be estopped from
assessing penalties or interest for those periods.
"Unlike under federal tax law, no Commission rules or
regulations directly address the effect of the Commission's 1988
actions in this case. Under the Internal Revenue Code regulations,
however, when a preliminary examination of a return results in
questions, a personal interview is scheduled.
If the taxpayer
furnishes sufficient explanation and the audit officer does not
believe that further factual investigation is required, the case is
deemed closed. See generally. Treas. Reg. § 601.105. Once a case
is closed, it may be reopened to make an adjustment unfavorable to
the taxpayer only under special circumstances, none of which are
These
present in this case.
See Treas. Reg. § 601.105(j).
regulations give voice and substance to the salutary policy of
finality and recognize the established rule that administrative
bodies should be prohibited from continually reviewing their own
decisions and revoking actions once duly taken by them. See 73A
C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure, § 155, note 46.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the
Final Decision of
DATED this

.e Commission.
day of August, 1991.
HAN^EN\ JONES & LETA

SoQtt R. NSa#jpenter
Stephen R. Cochell
Attorneys for Petitioners
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ADDENDUM TO APPELLANTS' BRIEF

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
JAMES AND BEVERLY O'ROURKE,

)

Petitioners, )
V.

)

AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

)
:

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND FINAL DECISION
Appeal No. 90-0038

)

Respondent.

)

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
for a formal hearing on January 14, 1991.

Paul F. Iwasaki,

Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the
Commission.

Present

and

representing

the

Petitioners

Steven Cochell and Scott Carpenter, Attorneys at Law.

were

Present

and representing the Respondent was Mark Wainwright, Assistant
Attorney General.
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The tax in question is income tax.

2.

The audit periods in question

3.

The Petitioners are husband and wife who, for the

are 1983 through

1988.

audit

periods

returns.

in question,

filed

joint

federal

income tax

The husband, James O'Rourke (hereinafter singularly

referred to as

H

Petitioneru), worked as an airline pilot for

Eastern Airlines.

The wife, Beverly O'Rourke, was not employed

during the audit periods in question.
4.

As a pilot, the Petitioner would fly into and out

of a "home base'1 city.
Petitioner

flew

for

had

Specifically, the airline which the
six major

bases

in cities

primarily in the eastern part of the United States.

located

All trips,

or sequences, which the pilots were assigned to fly originated
from and finished

at the home base to which the pilot was

assigned.
5.

For

1982 through

home base was New York.

April

1983, the Petitioner's

From April 1983 through December 1984,

the Petitioner's home base was Houston.

After December 1984,

the Petitioner's home base was Atlanta and remained so until
his retirement from the airline.
6.

When

assigned

to

each

of the home bases, the

Petitioner would make living arrangements during his stay in
those home bases.

Typically,

the Petitioner would

rent an

apartment in the home base city and commute to his family on
those days he was not working.
7.

Prior

to August

1982, the

family resided in Miami, Florida.

Petitioner

and

his

In the latter part of 1980,

the Petitioners decided that Miami was no

longer a suitable

place in which to raise their family, so they began to make
plans to relocate.
8.
purchased
Florida.
land

and

In furtherance of those plans, the Petitioners
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acres

of

orange

grove

property

in

Eustis,

It was their intention to build a home on part of the
raise

oranges

on

the

remaining

acreage.

The

Petitioners had expected the profits received from the sale of
oranges to finance the construction of the home.

That purchase

occurred in December 1980.
9.

Approximately

one

week

after

purchasing

the

orange grove, the Eustis area suffered a freeze which destroyed
the orange crop and damaged some of the trees.

As a result,

the Petitioners did not realize any income from the orange crop
for 1981.

The Petitioners, therefore, were unable to begin

construction on their home during that period of time.
10.

In

May

1981,

the

Petitioners

additional eight acres of property
orange grove.

located

purchased

adjacent

an

to the

The purpose of that acreage purchase was to

provide land upon which the Petitioners could build a home for
Mr.

O'Rourke's

parents.

Included

in that

eight

acres was

approximately four acres of orange trees.
11.

During 1982, although the Petitioners were unable

to begin construction of their home in Eustis, the Petitioners
still desired to move out of the Miami area.

They, therefore,

began looking for suitable homes in other parts of Florida;
however, could not find anything which they felt to be suitable
which was in their affordable

price

range

of

approximately

$140,000.
12.
area,

Having found no suitable homes

the Petitioners

expcinded

their

search

in the Florida
and

ultimately

decided to purchase a home in the Olympus Cove area of Salt
Lake City.

In August 1982, the Petitioners purchased said home

for $125,000. The Petitioners made a down payment on that home

-3-

of $45,000.

That money was obtained

from a portion of the

profit realized when the Petitioners sold their home in Miami,
13.

Within a few months of purchasing the Salt Lake

City home, the Petitioners began to remodel it.

During the

first few months they were in the Salt Lake City home, they
expended approximately $10,000 in improvements to the kitchen
and bathroom areas of that home.

During the Petitioners stay

in that home from 1982 until its sale in 1989, the Petitioners
made improvements to the home in the amount of approximately
$35,000.
14.

In

1982,

the

Petitioner's

parents,

at

the

suggestion of the Petitioner, moved into an unoccupied house in
Salt Lake City which was owned by the Petitioner's brother.
The plan being that when the brother returned to reoccupy the
house

in

1984,

after

having

fulfilled

his

contractual

obligations with his employer, the Petitioner would then be in
a position to build the parents a house on the Eustis property.
15.
in

April

anticipated.

The brother's return to Salt Lake City occurred
1983,

substantially

earlier

than

had

been

The Petitioner, having felt some obligation to

his parents, refinanced his home in Salt Lake City and obtained
enough

money

to

make

a

down payment

on

a home which

purchased in Sandy, Utah, for his parents to live in.

he
The

parents occupied that house from April 1983 until August 1987,
at which time they returned to Florida.

Thereafter, and until

1990, the Petitioner maintained possession of the house until
its sale in 1990.
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16.

In 1983, the Petitioners1

orange grove suffered

again from a freeze, which led to no income being produced from
that orange grove.

In 1984, a freeze again occurred which

destroyed every orange tree on the property.
17.

Because of the Petitioner's financial situation,

he was forced to sell the Eustis property and did so in 1987.
Under the terms of that sale contract, the Petitioners received
some money in 1987 and 1988, and the balance of the sale price
in 1989.
18.

During

the

audit

periods

in

question,

Petitioner had three home bases from which he flew.

the
Those

were: (1) New York City, New York; (2) Houston, Texas; and (3)
Atlanta, Georgia.

When not in his home base, and on his days

off, the Petitioner would commute to his home and family in
Salt

Lake

City,

personal reasons.

or

would

visit

other

cities

for

various

Petitioner also would visit Florida to check

on his property there.

The ability to fly free as a benefit of

his employment with the airline, made such travel possible for
the Petitioner.
19.
income

tax

During the audit periods, the Petitioner paid no
to

any

state,

including

those

states

which

constituted his home base.
20.
airline.

In November 1988, the Petitioner retired from the

The

Petitioner

currently

resides

in

Tacoma,

Washington, where he is employed by an aircraft manufacturer.
21.

The Petitioner testified that during the entire

audit period, it was always his intention to return to Florida
-5-

to live as soon as he was in a position where he could afford
to do so.
22.

The

audit period.

Petitioner

owned

several

cars

during

the

A number of those vehicles were registered to

the Petitioner in Utah.

The Petitioner also owned a vehicle

which was registered to him

in the state of Florida.

That

vehicle was the vehicle which the Petitioner took with him to
each of his home bases and used for transportation while in
those home bases.

Mr. O'Rourke possessed

license during the audit periods.

a Florida drivers

Mrs. O'Rourke obtained a

Utah driver license in 1982, which she maintained through 1988.
23.

The Petitioner did not spend an aggregate of 183

or more days in any of the years of the audit periods.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A "resident individual" for Utah income tax purposes,
who is then subject to the imposition of an income tax, means
an individual who is domiciled in this state for any period of
time during the taxable year, but only for the duration of such
period, or an individual who is not domiciled in the state but
maintains a permanent place of abode in this state and spends
an aggregate of 183 or more days of the taxable year in the
state.

(Utah Code Ann. S59-10-103(l)(j).)
"Domicile" means the place where an individual has a

true, fixed, permanent home and principal establishment, and to
which place he has (whenever he is absent) the intention of
returning.

It is the place in which a person has voluntarily

fixed the habitation of himself
-6-

and family, not

for a mere

special or temporary purpose, but with the present intention of
making

a

permanent

home.

(Utah

State

Tax

Commission

Administrative Rule R865-9-2i(D).)
DECISION AND ORDER
In the present case, the singular issue to be decided
by the Commission

is whether

or not

the

Petitioner was a

"resident" for Utah income tax purposes as defined under Utah
State

statute and Utah State

Tax

Commission

Administrative

Rules.
It is the Petitioner's position that the Petitioner
never intended to abandon his domicile in Florida, nor did he
ever intend to establish a domicile in Utah.

The Petitioner

testified that it was always his intention to construct a home
on the Eustis property and live in Florida permanently.
While
intention

or

the
hope

Petitioner
of

someday

may

indeed

returning

have
to

had

Florida,

some
such

intentions were nothing more than mere hopes of some future
expectation, the date of the occurrence of which was unknown.
On the other hand, the evidence clearly established that the
Petitioner voluntarily disposed of his place of habitation in
Florida and voluntarily moved himself and his family to Utah,
where he acquired a new place of habitation.
The fact that the Petitioner may have considered his
Salt Lake City residence to be his place of residence only
until he was financially able to relocate back to Florida, does
not require a finding that the Salt Lake residence was not his
true, fixed, nor permanent home and

principle

until he was someday able to return to Florida.

establishment
Under those

circumstances, it cannot be said that the Salt Lake residence
was

a

place

purpose.

of

There

habitation
having

been

for

a

special

no definite,

or
or

a

temporary

even

foreseen

period when the Petitioners would have moved back to Florida,
the Salt Lake home was the Petitioners* permanent home.
Under the Administrative Rule defining domicile, the
evidence

has

established

that

the

Petitioner's

Salt

Lake

residence was the place where his true, fixed, and permanent
home

rested,

and was

also

the place

to which

intention of returning whenever he was absent.

he had the
The evidence

further established that such could not have been the case with
any place in Florida since the Petitioner had no residence in
Florida to either be absent from nor to return to.
The facts also clearly support

a finding

that

the

Petitioner not only abandoned his old domicile in Florida by
voluntarily and intentionally selling his residence there and
relocating to Utah, but also establishes that he intended to
establish a new domicile in Utah.
The Petitioner would argue that he never intended to
make

Utah

his

permanent

place

of

residence.

While

the

Petitioner may have always entertained a hope of returning to
Florida,

his

actions

in

Utah

sufficiently

demonstrate

intention to make Utah his domicile while here.

his

In support of

that finding are the facts that he purchased a home in Utah,
and then expended a significant amount of money in improving
that home; he moved his wife and children with him to Utah, and
while here, his children attended Utah schools; he purchased a
second

home

in

Utah

into

which

his

parents

moved;

his

automobiles were registered in Utah; and, that it was his Utah
home to which he returned whenever absent from it.
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax
that the Petitioners

were

Commission

finds

resident individuals of Utah for

income tax purposes and thus responsible for filing and paying
Utah income tax returns.

Therefore, the determination of the

Auditing Division is affirmed.
DATED this

Z

It is so ordered.

day of Qrtju 0

1991.

BY^eSDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.
ABSENT
[.' Hansen
Chairman
^
"7

Roger 0. Tew
Commissi

^

>e B. Pacheco
"Commissioner

G. Blaine Davis
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(1),
63-46b-14(2)(a).
PFI/sd/1138w

/ ^ coy*

{.(SEAL)
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Decision to the following:
James & Beverly O'Rourke
c/o Hansen Jones & Leta
Valley Tower Building, Sixth Floor
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT
84101
Brent Barney
Auditing Division
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT

84134

Mark Wainwright
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State, #1100
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
James H. Rogers
Director, Auditing Div.
Heber M. Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
DATED this

^

day

of (lfl/u'9

o.wu

Secretary
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